During the summer of 1942 Admiral Nimitz decided to
employ Carlson’s battalion for its designated purpose. Planners
selected Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands as the target. They made
available two large mine-laying submarines, the Nautilus and the
Argonaut. Each one could carry a company of raiders. The force would
make a predawn landing on Butaritari Island, destroy the garrison
(estimated at 45 men), withdraw that evening, and land the next day
on Little Makin Island. The scheduled D-day was 17 August, 10 days
after the 1st Marine Division and the 1st
Raiders assaulted the lower Solomons. The objectives of the
operation were diverse: to destroy installations, take prisoners,
gain intelligence on the area, and divert Japanese attention and
reinforcements from Guadalcanal and Tulagi.
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Undercover
Agent? |
Companies A and B drew the mission and boarded the
submarines on 8 August. Once in the objective area, things began to
go badly. The subs surfaced in heavy rain and high seas. Due to the
poor conditions, Carlson altered his plan at the last minute.
Instead of each company landing on widely separated beaches, they
would go ashore together. Lieutenant Oscar F. Peatross, a platoon
commander, did not get the word; he and the squad in his boat ended
up landing alone in what became the enemy rear. The main body
reached shore in some confusion due to engine malfunctions and
weather, then the accidental discharge of a weapon ruined any hope
of surprise.
First Lieutenant Merwyn C. Plumley’s Company A quickly
crossed the narrow island and turned southwest toward the known
enemy positions. Company B, commanded by Captain Ralph H. Coyt,
followed in trace as the reserve. Soon thereafter the raiders were
engaged in a firefight with the Japanese. Sergeant Clyde Thomason
died in this initial action while courageously exposing himself in
order to direct the fire of his platoon. He later was awarded the
Medal of Honor, the first enlisted Marine so decorated in World War
II.
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Battalion Command:
Carlson and Roosevelt
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The raiders made little headway against Japanese machine
guns and snipers. Then the enemy launched two banzai attacks, each
announced with a bugle call. Marine fire easily dispatched both
groups of charging enemy soldiers. Unbeknownst to the Americans,
they had nearly wiped out the Japanese garrison at that point in the
battle.
At 1130 two enemy aircraft appeared over the island and
scouted the scene of action. Carlson had trained his men to remain
motionless and not fire at planes. With no troops in sight and no
contact from their own ground force, the planes finally dropped
their bombs, though none landed within Marine lines. Two hours later
12 planes arrived on the scene, several of them seaplanes. Two of
the larger flying boats landed in the lagoon. Raider machine guns
and Boys antitank rifles fired at them. One burst into flame and the
other crashed on takeoff after receiving numerous hits. The
remaining aircraft bombed and strafed the island for an hour, again
with most of the ordnance hitting enemy-occupied territory. Another
air attack came later in the afternoon.
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Get the
Point?? |
The natives on the island willingly assisted the
Americans throughout the day. They carried ammunition and provided
intelligence. The latter reports suggested that enemy reinforcements
had come ashore from the seaplanes and from two small ships in the
lagoon. (The submarines later took the boats under indirect fire
with their deck guns and miraculously sunk both). Based on this
information, Carlson was certain there was still a sizable Japanese
force on the island. At 1700 he called several individuals together
and contemplated his options. Roosevelt and the battalion operations
officer argued for a withdrawal as planned in preparation for the
next day’s landing on Little Making. Concerned that he might become
too heavily engaged if he tried to advance, Carlson decided to
follow their recommendation.
This part of the operation went smoothly for a time. The
force broke contact in good order and a group of 20 men covered the
rest of the raiders as they readied their rubber boats and shoved
off. Carlson, however, forgot about the covering force and thought
his craft contained the last men on the island when it entered the
water at 1930. Disaster then struck in the form of heavy surf. The
outboard engines did not work and the men soon grew exhausted trying
to paddle against the breakers. Boats capsized and equipment
disappeared. After repeated attempts several boatloads made it to
the rendezvous with the submarines, but Carlson and 120 men ended up
stranded on the shore. Only the covering force and a handful of
others had weapons. In the middle of the night a small Japanese
patrol approached the perimeter. They wounded a sentry, but not
before the killed three of them.
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Bosom
Buddies! |
With the enemy apparently still full of fight and his
raiders disorganized and weakened, Carlson called another council of
war. Without much input from the others, he decided to surrender.
His stated reasons were concern for the wounded, and for the
possible fate of the president’s son (who was not present at the
meeting). At 0330 Carlson sent his operations officer and another
Marine out to contact the enemy. They found one Japanese soldier and
eventually succeeded in giving him a note offering surrender.
Carlson also authorized every man to fend for himself – those who
wished could make another attempt to reach the submarines. By the
next morning several more boatloads made it through the surf,
including one with Major Roosevelt. In the meantime, a few exploring
raiders killed several Japanese, one of them probably the man with
the surrender note.
With dawn the situation appeared dramatically better. The
two-man surrender party reported that there appeared to be no
organized enemy force left on the island. There were about 70
raiders still ashore, and the able-bodied armed themselves with
weapons lying about the battlefield. Carlson organized patrols to
search for food and the enemy. They killed two more Japanese
soldiers and confirmed the lack of opposition. The raider commander
himself led a patrol to survey the scene and carry out the
demolition of military stores and installations. He counted 83 dead
Japanese and 14 of his own killed in the action. Based on native
reports, Carlson thought his force had accounted for more than 160
Japanese. Enemy aircraft made four separate attacks during the day,
but they inflicted no losses on the raider force
ashore.
The Marines contacted the submarines during the day and
arranged an evening rendezvous off the entrance to the lagoon, where
there was no surf to hinder an evacuation. The men hauled four
rubber boats across the island and arranged for the use of a native
outrigger. By 2300 the remainder of the landing force was back on
board the Nautilus and Argonaut. Since the entire withdrawal had
been so disorganized, the two companies were intermingled on the
submarines and it was not until they returned to Pearl Harbor that
they could make an accurate accounting of their losses. The official
tally was 18 dead and 12 missing.
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Great Pair of Legs
- Frog that is! |
Only after the war would the Marine Corps discover that
nine of the missing raiders had been left alive on the island. These
men had become separated from the main body at one point or another
during the operation. With the assistance of the natives the group
evaded capture for a time, but finally surrendered on 30 August. A
few weeks later the Japanese beheaded them on the island of
Kwajalein.
The raid itself had mixed results. Reports painted it as
a great victory and it boosted morale on the home front. Many
believed it achieved its original goal of diverting forces from
Guadalcanal, but the Japanese had immediately guessed the size and
purpose of the operation and had not let it alter their plans for
the Solomons. However, it did cause the enemy to worry about the
potential for other such raids on rear area installations. On the
negative side, that threat may have played a part in the subsequent
Japanese decision to fortify heavily places like Tarawa Atoll, the
scene of a costly amphibious assault later in the war. At the
tactical level, the 2d Raiders had proven themselves in direct
combat with the enemy. Their greatest difficulties had involved
rough seas and poor equipment; bravery could not fix those
limitations. Despite the trumpeted success of the operation, the
Navy never again attempted to use submarines to conduct raids behind
enemy lines.
Carlson received the Navy Cross for his efforts on Makin,
and the public accorded him hero status. A few of those who served
with him were not equally pleased with his performance. No one
questioned his demonstrated bravery under fire, but some junior
officers were critical of his leadership, especially the attempt to
surrender to a non-existent enemy. Carlson himself later noted that
he had reached "a spiritual low" on the night of the
17th. And again on the evening of the 18th,
the battalion commander contemplated remaining on the island to
organize the natives for resistance, while others supervised the
withdrawal of his unit. Those who criticized him thought he had lost
his aggressiveness and ability to think clearly when the chips were
down. But he and his raiders would have another crack at the enemy
in the not too distant future.